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 COMPILING THE TERRITORIAL CODES
 OF WASHINGTON
 The story of the codes of laws which have been used in the
 Territory of Washington is little known. Little has been said
 of their influence on the legal history of the territory and state,
 and less has been recorded concerning those whose legal skill
 has produced these codifications. Some phases of the historical
 influences which form the background of the codes of Wash-
 ington Territory, and the important parts played by their
 makers, have become either lost or shrouded in oblivion. In the
 not far distant future the stories of other phases of this legal
 history may pass from the memory of man and become likewise
 forgotten.
 I.
 The Oregon Territory, at the time when its area was great-
 est, included within its boundaries, in addition to the present
 state of Oregon, the vast expanse of lands now included in the
 states of Washington, Idaho, and part of Montana. Since this
 entire area constituted the Oregon Territory, the laws of Ore-
 gon prior to the partition of 1854 were the laws of those states
 and portions of states since carved from it. It follows then that
 the laws in force in Oregon at the time Washington was made
 a separate territory likewise had been the laws enforced in the
 area north of the Columbia River for the thirteen years preced-
 ing.
 It does not follow, because of the existence of a certain
 body of laws within a given area at the time it is made into a
 territory, that these laws shall become ipso facto the laws of the
 new territory. The newly created territorial legislature may, if
 it so desires, adopt any or all of them as the law of the new ter-
 ritory, or may reject them in toto and then proceed to enact a
 completely different body of statute law. However this may be,
 it is reasonable to presume that familiarity with the laws pre-
 viously existent will influence in a positive manner the legisla-
 tion subsequently enacted by the legislature of the newly creat-
 (3)
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 ed territory. Such influence was manifested in the selection of
 laws for the new territory of Washington in two definite ways.
 In the first place, the Congress of the United States included in
 the Organic Act creating the new territory a provision,1 con-
 tinuing in force in Washington Territory all laws of Oregon
 Territory, whether of federal or territorial origin, which were
 applicable to the new territory.
 This influence of the Oregon law was, in the second place,
 expressed by the first territorial legislature in its adoption of
 certain of the laws of Oregon which had been in force in the
 counties north of the Columbia. The laws of Oregon which
 were made a part of the statute law of Washington Territory
 in this manner were mostly from the political code of Oregon,
 and included the election law, and other laws with which the
 people were quite familiar.
 II.
 The first session of the territorial legislature of Washing-
 ton convened in Olympia, on February 28, 1854. It is interest-
 ing to note that the first bill introduced into the House of Rep-
 resentatives was "An act to provide for the appointment of a
 board of commissioners to prepare a code of laws for the terri-
 tory of Washington." The importance given to the need for
 drafting a code of laws for the territory was partly a reflection
 of that public sentiment which sought the enactment of a com-
 plete system of laws especially applicable to the new territory.
 Such a sentiment was crystallized in an editorial comment2 by
 one of the leading newspapers in which the editor expressed a
 feeling that the laws "should be few and well ordered," and
 "that none should be enacted without suitable deliberation, an3
 with an object to their being favorably received, enforced, and
 applicable to this portion of the Pacific Coast." The editorial
 advised the repeal of the "Oregon Steamboat Code," and "Blue
 Books," which had been the subject of so much confusion and
 objection south of the Columbia River,8 and urged the appoint-
 ment of a code commission to complete a code of laws. What
 1 Act. of March 2, 1853, Ch. 90, Sec. 12, 10 Stat. 177.
 2 Olympia (Wash.) The Pioneer and Democrat, February 11, 1854.
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 may appear to the reader as somewhat amusing was his argu-
 ment that the new territory was now "of age" and that the
 "people did not wish to be tributary to Oregon for our laws."
 Governor Stevens likewise sensed the importance of the
 matter of such legislation, and in his message to his first legis-
 lature urged that certain of the laws of Oregon be re-enacted :
 "In the matter of legislation/' he said, "I would suggest that, as there
 seems to be some ambiguity as to the state of statute law at present in
 force in this Territory, some course be adopted which, while it frees us
 from the present uncertainty, shall not render the community entirely des-
 titute of law. Such a result might be effected, by enacting such of the
 laws of Oregon as still remain applicable to this Territory, and by having
 at the same time suitable persons occupied in preparing such acts as the
 present exigencies may need."4
 The act which provided for the code commission was pas-
 sed on March 3,5 and by its terms appointed as members there-
 of Edward Lander, then United States District Attorney, Vic-
 tor Monroe and William Strong, both of whom were distin-
 guished judges of the territory. It was to be their duty to pre-
 pare such laws as in their judgment would be applicable to, and
 necessary for preserving the public peace and well being of the
 inhabitants of the territory.
 The personnel of the commission represented some of the
 most brilliant legal minds within the new territory. In his Hist-
 ory of Washington, Snowden has said that :
 "Wiser selections could not have been made. The commissioners
 were already trained in the law, familiar with its forms, and experienced
 in its administration. They knew better than anybody else then in the ter-
 ritory could know, what would be required to set up a government, main-
 tain public order, provide for public improvements, establish courts and
 regulate the practice in them ; to define crimes and various offenses, and
 prescribe their punishment, as well as to provide for levying, collecting
 and disbursing revenue. They knew also how to avail themselves of the
 experience; and they knew how to put all these things in form, so that
 they would conform to the organic law, and stand the test of administra-
 tion."6
 3 Arthur S. Beardsley, "Code Making in Early Oregon," in The Pacific North-
 west Quarterly (Seattle, 1936), xxvii, 10.
 4 Journal of the House ot Representatives, iö^-, ¿u.
 'Laws of Washington, 1854,451. _ _ _ _
 «C. A. Snowden, History of Washington ^JNew xonc, iwyj, hi, ¿o/.
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 The act creating the code commission required the com-
 missioners to submit to the standing committees of the legisla-
 ture from day to day such laws as they had drafted. This was
 done to avoid any difficulty over the interpretation of section
 six of the Organic Act which required that each act should em-
 brace but one object to be expressed in its title. Doubtless, the
 memory of the quarrel over the validity of the "Steamboat
 Code" of Oregon was still fresh in their minds.7 The presence
 upon the code commission of Judge Strong was another check
 against any attempt that might be made to adopt a code in one
 single act. Judge Strong, while sitting as a judge of the Su-
 preme Court of Oregon Territory, had already declared that
 such a proceedure was in conflict with a provision in the Organ-
 ic Act of Oregon Territory identical to that of section six of the
 Organic Act of Washington. The powers of the commission
 were very broad and were limited only by the need of preserv-
 ing the public peace and well-being of the inhabitants.
 Included in the sixty-five acts of a general nature enacted
 at this session were the various practice and procedural codes,
 such as the Civil Practice Act, the Criminal Code, the Crimi-
 nal Practice Act, the Probate Code, and the Justice Practice
 Code. It was in connection with the drafting of these codes
 that the work of the code commission was best performed. The
 Civil Practice Act was in the main based upon the law of New
 York with occasional interpretations from Indiana and Ohio.
 These were the states in which the commissioners had resided
 before coming to the Oregon country, and naturally represented
 the laws with which they were most familiar. The other acts
 show unmistakingly the influence of the Oregon laws which
 had been borrowed from the laws of Iowa.
 After a session lasting sixty- four days, the legislature ad-
 journed on May 1, 1854. Shortly before adjournment the code
 commission submitted its final report, and in a letter to the
 legislature expressed its feeling of the honor of having been
 able to assist in framing a body of laws. It commented upon
 the difficulties under which its work had been done, the limited
 time allowed in which to do it, and the "want of the statutes of
 7 Beardsley, "Code Making in Early Oregon," 10.
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 most of the older states." The commissioners recognized the
 probable presence of many errors which would require correc-
 tion at some future time, but expressed the hope that they were
 not such as would create serious embarrassments in the admin-
 istration of justice.
 Such historians as have discussed the work of this first
 legislature have given it high praise. They have referred to the
 fact that the laws passed at this session remained the law of the
 territory for many years, and that subsequent amendments in
 no way improved the "system [of law] which had emanated
 from those two vigorous legal minds and learned jurists, Ed-
 ward Lander and William Strong."8
 III.
 In commenting upon the unwise legislative attempts to im-
 prove the quality of the provisions of the Code of 1854, Judge
 Elwood Evans spoke with a first-hand acquaintance, although
 his comments were written many years after these attempts at
 codification had been made. He had been closely associated
 with these subsequent revisions of statutory law. In fact, he
 had served as code commissioner during several of the legis-
 lative sessions which had provided the Codes of 1859, 1863,
 1871, and 1873 respectively. His reference to the "creditable
 system" of laws adopted in 1854 and the innovations made by
 these later revisions must not be construed as reflecting a qual-
 ity of impotence in the later codes, nor a criticism of his own
 contributions to the statute law of Washington. The thought
 which he endeavored to express was that of the enduring qual-
 ity of the Code of 1854. He regarded it in much the same man-
 ner as it was referred to by Judge Lander, who characterized it
 as constituting a "body of laws which are to become the founda-
 tion of jurisprudence in our young Territory."
 The revisions of the Code of 1854 which were made in
 1859, 1863, 1869, 1871, and 1873 respectively, had as their ob-
 ject the perfection of the acts of civil procedure and practice,
 8 Elwood Evans, "Political and local history of Washington as a separate Ter-
 ritorial Government . . . ," in History of The Pacific Northwest: Oregon and Wash-
 ington (Portland, Ore., 1889), i, 466. Evans for some reason omits all reference to
 Victor Monroe.
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 criminal procedure, probate procedure, and justice court proce-
 dure. They were complete codes of these statutory practices in
 much the same form as similar laws are now codified in several
 states - California being a typical example. With the exception
 of the Code of 1869, they are not to be regarded as general
 codes or compilations; nor should they be compared with the
 expertly developed codes of the present day, except in so far as
 they were then, as now, the measure of the extent of social and
 economic relations.
 The first agitation for a revision of the Code of 1854 be-
 gan in 1857. The Code of 1854 had been in operation less than
 three years when the territorial legislature considered a joint
 resolution to appoint a committee of five members to "inquire
 into the expediency of appointing a commission to revise the
 laws of this Territory." This committee on December 24, 1857,
 recommended that a committee from both branches of the legis-
 lature be appointed as a commission to compile and codify the
 laws of the territory prior to the opening of the next session of
 the legislative assembly.9
 This resolution had originated in the House of Represent-
 atives, and although it was accepted by the Council on Decem-
 ber 24, it was displaced by Council Joint Resolution No. 210
 which was agreed to by the House of Representatives and be-
 came effective on January 6, 1858. The latter resolution was
 designed to relieve the legislature from the arduous task of
 code revision and to appoint a commission of experts to per-
 form this duty. By its terms it provided for the appointment of
 William Strong, Selucius Garfielde, and Butler P. Anderson to
 act as code commissioners to revise and compile the laws of
 Washington Territory11 and to report their labor to the next
 legislative session (1858).
 Probably the report of this code commission was for the
 most part the work of Mr. Anderson, who was then living in
 Olympia. There is nothing to show that the other commission-
 ers contributed anything toward it. In fact, the joint resolution
 passed by the next succeeding legislature on December 16,
 » Journal of the Council. 1857-58. 49.
 10 ibid., 62.
 n Laws of Washington, 1857-58, 69.
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 1859, hinted as much. It referred to the report as "made by
 B. P. Anderson, Esq., one member of the commission appointed
 at the last session ... to revise and compile the laws. . . .ma The
 purpose of this resolution of December 16, 1859, was to "take
 into consideration and recommend some course to be pursued
 relative to the report."13
 When the legislature convened in December 1858, Mr.
 Anderson addressed a letter to the Speaker14 of the House
 of Representatives advising him that, as one of the code
 commissioners, he had devoted his spare time to the task of
 compiling the statutes, and that he had covered about one-third
 of the laws. He stated that a complete "revision" had not been
 attempted ; and that more time would be required if the legisla-
 ture desired the compilation to be completed at that time.
 The code, which Mr. Anderson presented, was made the
 subject of a joint resolution15 passed December 14, 1858, creat-
 ing a special joint committee of members from both houses "to
 take into consideration and recommend some course to be pur-
 sued . . . relative to the report . . . ." The special joint commit-
 tee, speaking through its chairman, reported to the legislature
 December 16 16 "that about two-thirds of said laws have been
 compiled, and that twenty-five days will be required to finish
 the compilation. Therefore, the committee have instructed me
 to recommend that B. P. Anderson, Esq., be requested to com-
 plete the compilation, and report the same to this Legislative
 Assembly on or before the 20th day of January, 1859."
 On the 19th day of January, Mr. Anderson addressed an-
 other letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, ad-
 vising him that the work of compiling the laws had been com-
 pleted, and had been turned over to the legislative committee.
 12 Laws of Washington, 1858-59, 67-68.
 18Judge Strong had previously served on the Code Commission of 1854 and was
 at this time an associate justice of the Supreme Court; Butler P. Anderson and
 Selucius Garfielde were both prominent members of the territorial bar. Mr. Ander-
 son had been prosecuting attorney of the territory. Mr. Garfielde, a resident of Se-
 attle, later served as Surveyor-General, Delegate to Congress, and Collector of Cus-
 toms. He was famed as an orator of unusual ability.
 14 Journal of the House of Representatives, 1858-59, 7-8.
 ™Laws of Washington, 1858-59, 67 ; Journal of the Council 1858-59, 25.
 16 Journal of the House of Representatives, 1858-59, 34; Journal of the Council,
 1858-59, 30.
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 He called particular attention to the fact that only the general
 laws had been codified, and that private and local laws had been
 purposely omitted, as well as those which were either obsolete
 or had been expressly repealed.
 After considering the proposed Code of 1859 (1860) this
 select committee, again speaking through its chairman, J. D.
 Biles, on January 20th reported to the legislature17 that they
 had examined the report of Butler P. Anderson, and that it was
 what it purported to be, an all-sufficient revision and com-
 pilation of the laws of Washington Territory. The committee
 concluded its report by recommending that the proposed code
 be "laid upon the table of the House," which was done. There
 it remained until it was revived by the legislative session of
 1859-60.
 Political squabbles and personal animosities kept the re-
 port of Mr. Anderson from favorable consideration for some
 time after the legislative session of 1859-60 had begun. The
 controversy concerned in no way the qualifications of Mr. An-
 derson as a codifier nor the quality of his labors. It was rather
 a question of whether the territory or the United States should
 provide the compensation for the work of preparing the com-
 pilation and the funds for printing it. The Congress had pro-
 vided most of the costs of previous printings of the laws and
 the codes, although the expenses incident to the preparation
 of the same had been recognized as a proper territorial expense.
 The policy of opposition to the adoption of this Code of
 1859 (1860) was largely reflected in the activities of H. J.
 G. Maxon, of Clark county. On the 24th of January, 1859, Mr.
 Maxon introduced a resolution into the Council which stated in
 its preamble that18
 "Whereas, it is the opinion of this council that the joint resolution
 passed by the last legislature, authorizing a board of commissioners to re-
 vise and compile the laws of Washington Territory, was not complied
 with, and that the compilation made by B. P. Anderson, Esq., was not
 authorized; and
 "Whereas, we are of opinion that this legislature and the people of
 the territory are responsible for, and that the territorial treasury is liable
 to be drawn upon for said compilation ; therefore
 « Ibid.. 166.
 18 Journal of the Council, 1858-59, 176.
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 "Resolved, that the President of the Council be, and he is hereby,
 instructed to address a note to B. P. Anderson, Esq., asking him to com-
 municate in writing to this body that he will, in no event, claim of this
 territory, whether as a part of the commission, or as an individual acting
 upon his own responsibility, (until authorized by the present legislature,)
 any compensation whatever from the treasury of said territory, to the end
 that the whole subject under consideration may be spread upon the jour-
 nals, and thus be made a matter of record."
 Apparently two reasons were in Mr. Maxon's mind for in-
 troducing the above resolution. Both were extremely technical
 in their character and probably reflected a personal antipathy
 toward a revision of the Code. The joint resolution which had
 been adopted on January 6, 1858, providing for the code com-
 mission, had stated that ". . . it shall be their [commissioners']
 duty to report the result of their labors to the next legislative
 assembly; Provided, however, that in no event shall the terri-
 torial treasury be drawn upon for said revision. And provided
 further, that in case any of the above named commissioners re-
 fuse to act as such, the Governor of this Territory may appoint
 some suitable person to fill the vacancy occasioned by such re-
 fusal."19 Two members of the said commission had refused to
 act; and it was evident, notwithstanding the language of the
 resolution of January 6, 1858, that the territory would be called
 upon to reimburse Mr. Anderson for his labors. So, if the reso-
 lution of January 6, 1858 was to be given a strict interpreta-
 tion, it had not, as Mr. Maxon contended, been complied with.
 Mr. Maxon apparently was willing to waive the first objection
 if Mr. Anderson was willing to look to the United States rather
 than to the territory for his remuneration. In the meantime,
 the House had received House Bill No. 57 providing for the
 publication of the compiled laws of Washington Territory.
 The Council was notified of the introduction of this bill on
 January 27, 1859.
 Anticipating a negative reply from Mr. Anderson to this
 resolution of January 24, 1859, Mr. Maxon introduced into the
 Council on January 27th a resolution addressed to the public
 printer, Mr. Furste,20
 19 Laws of Washington, 1857-58, 69.
 20 Journal of the Council, 1858-59, 192.
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 "asking him to communicate in writing, distinctly stating whether or
 not he is willing to print the revision and compilation of laws of Wash-
 ington Territory, made by B. P. Anderson, Esq. ; and should such will-
 ingness be expressed, that he be asked to state, unequivocally, that in no
 event will he look to Washington Territory, (or the treasury thereof), for
 any portion of the cost of the printing of said revision and compilation/'
 Written replies were received by the Council on January
 28, 1859, from both Mr. Anderson and Mr. Furste. Their con-
 tents are not stated in the Council proceedings but the inference
 is clear that in both cases the answer was in the negative. On
 motion of Mr. Maxon, the reply was, in each case, referred to
 the Ways and Means Committee - an appropriate place in
 which to bury them.21
 The day following the receipt of the replies from Mr. An-
 derson and Mr. Furste, (January 29, 1859) the chairman of
 the Judiciary committee, Mr. Maxon, introduced Council Bill
 No. 31, entitled, "An act to provide for the appointment of a
 board of commissioners to prepare, revise and compile a code of
 laws for Washington Territory."
 While these proceedings were going on in the Council, the
 House had passed22 a bill to pay for the cost of Mr. Anderson's
 compilation, which in the Council reached two readings, and
 was then referred to the committee on Ways and Means. The
 committee reported the bill back to the Council without recom-
 mendation, and this on being ordered to a third reading, was on
 the motion of Mr. Maxon laid on the table and made a special or-
 der for the fourth of February ensuing. This was a death blow
 to the bill for the payment of Mr. Anderson's services, since
 February 4 was to be the day after the constitutional limit of
 21 At this point it would seem appropriate to discuss the significance of the con-
 stantly recurring reference to the implied obligation of the United States to pay for
 the printing of the laws of the territory. This was an obligation which the federal
 government had assumed from the beginning of the territory. This responsibility of
 the federal government explains the annual attempts made tò revise the laws. The
 United States paid the bill. While the records show a persistent demand from the
 Governor, the public, and the press for a complete codification of the laws, the legis-
 lative assembly had just as persistently refused to grant their request, and had en-
 deavored to placate the public by reenactments of the practice codes as part of the
 session laws, knowing that these costs would be assumed by the federal government,
 whereas the cost of a complete codification might not be assumed. Hence the con-
 troversy over the Anderson code was in reality a fight to impose the cost of the
 Code of 1859 (1860) upon the federal government, thereby saving the expenditure of
 territorial funds.
 22 Evans, "Political and local history of Washington . . . ," in History of The
 Pacific Northwest, i, 523.
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 the legislature had expired and the day following the adjourn-
 ment thereof.
 When House Bill No. 57, entitled "An act to provide for
 the publication of the compiled laws of Washington Territory/'
 came before the Council, it was referred to the committee on
 Ways and Means which reported it out for further action of
 the Council. It came before the Council for the first test on
 Tuesday, February 1, 1859. There Mr. Maxon, attacked it by a
 motion to lay it on the table and to make it a "special order of
 the day for the 4th of July next."23 Apparently he wished it to
 die amid the glamour of a patriotic celebration. Thus ended the
 attempt to provide for the publication of the compiled laws of
 Washington Territory as a separate publication independent
 of the session laws of 1859-60.
 The Council Bill No. 31, entitled "An act to provide for
 the appointment of a board of commissioners to prepare, revise
 and compile a code of laws for Washington Territory," which
 had been introduced by Mr. Maxon had successfully passed the
 Council, but was amended in some manner (the proceedings do
 not indicate in what way) when it came before the House. The
 Council refused to concur in the House amendments and the bill
 failed of passage on February 2, 1859,24 the day before the last
 of the legislative session.
 The Code of 1859 (1860) was the result of the work of
 the code commission of 1858. While it is referred to as the
 Code of 1859 /it was not enacted into law until early in January
 of I860.25 A valid doubt existed as to the need for this code;
 and an opinion generally expressed was that it added nothing
 of importance to the Code of 1854. The popular esteem accord-
 ed the Code of 1854 may explain the lack of any evidence that
 Judge Strong had contributed his services to its preparation,
 IV
 It was the duty of the governor of the territory to refer in
 his legislative messages to such changes in the law as he
 deemed desirable. The fulfillment of this duty could be carried
 23 Journal of the Council, 1858-59, 221.
 2* Ibid., 22Ö.
 25 Laws of Washington, 1859-60.
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 out by advising the legislature that "a revision of our laws is
 badly needed." Sometimes he specifically referred to the short-
 age of copies of the session laws and made that condition the
 basis of his recommendation. Often-times the messages would
 use the word "compilation" jointly with the word "revision."
 It can hardly be supposed that such a recommendation by Gov-
 ernor Turney, on December 19, 1861, contemplated other than
 the amendment of such statutes as needed modification and
 their re-passage as complete acts. The legislative practice dur-
 ing this territorial period called for amending a statute by re-
 enacting it in toto with the changes desired ; whereas the prac-
 tice, today, is to pass an act amending only the sections con-
 cerned, leaving the remainder of the statute untouched. Cer-
 tainly the technical meaning of the words "revision" and "com-
 pilation," as they are used today, was not observed in the prep-
 aration of the territorial codes during the two decades follow-
 ing the organization of Washington Territory.
 The legislative session of 1861-62 made no efifort to en-
 act legislation for revising the territorial laws. Accordingly,
 when the session of 1862-63 convened, Governor Pickering de-
 voted a considerable portion of his legislative message to a plea
 for a "codification and republication of our Territorial Law,"
 in the belief that "convenience, necessity, and justice to the peo-
 ple require legislative action at this time, . . ,"26 This advice of
 the executive was followed and the Code of 1863 was the result.
 The Code of 1863 was the work of a special legislative
 code committee consisting of Judge Obadiah B. McFadden, for-
 mer chief justice of the Supreme Court, Paul K. Hubbs, repre-
 senting the Council, and J. D. Potter, S. D. Smith, and Paul K.
 Hubbs, Jr., representing the House of Representatives.27
 The authorization for the revision came through a joint
 resolution passed on December 22, 1862.28 The commissioners
 were to "re-codify the laws so far as practicable and to report
 the same to their respective houses for action during the pres-
 ent session of the legislature." The compilation resulting from
 26 Journal of the House of Representatives, 1862-63, 30.
 ¿1 It is interesting to note that iather and son served together on this commit-
 tee, the senior representing the upper house and the junior the lower.
 2S Journal of the Council, 1862-63, appendix x.
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 their efforts was adopted by the legislature, and thereby became
 the Code of 1863, It was regarded as an improvement over the
 preceding one.29
 V
 Less than four years elapsed before an agitation was be-
 gun for the revision of the Code of 1863. The principal reason
 assigned at this time for the need of a new code was the well-
 worn argument that but few copies of the laws were available
 for the use of lawyers and the public officials. "The efficiency
 of public servants, as well as the proper administration of jus-
 tice, require that they be put, as early as may be, in a shape that
 will place them within the reach of all," wrote Governor Moore
 in his legislative message of December 9, 1867.30 "I would rec-
 ommend, therefore, that commissioners, 'learned in the law,' be
 appointed to revise and codify all the statutes of the Territory
 now in force and that they be instructed to report the result of
 their labors to the Legislative Assembly, either at this or the
 next session."
 This legislative session approved the recommendation of
 Governor Moore for a revision of the laws and provided for
 the undertaking by means of a statute enacted January 29,
 1868.31 In making this provision for the Code of 1869 the Ter-
 ritorial legislature used the "statute" form of authorization in-
 stead of the more common "resolution" form.
 The statute in question provided that the governor was to
 appoint three "discreet" persons (the governor had recom-
 mended instead three persons "learned in the law") to act as
 code commissioners. They were to report their work to the
 following legislative session, (1869). In the light of their in-
 junction, "to thoroughly revise the statute laws ... in force . . . ,
 classifying and arranging the various subjects under appropri-
 ate titles, bringing together and incorporating the various
 amendments into the original acts, and rejecting all repealed,
 inoperative and obsolete statutes," one may wonder why the
 29 Laws of Washington, 1862-63.
 30 Journal of the House of Representatives, 1867-68, 31.
 31 Laws of Washington, 1867-68, 64.
This content downloaded from 205.175.118.27 on Fri, 08 Jun 2018 18:59:09 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 16 PACIFIC NORTHWEST QUARTERLY [January
 sole requisite of "discreetness" was made the basis of their
 qualifications as codifiers.
 That the commissioners failed to "thoroughly revise" the
 laws is evident from the changes which were subsequently im-
 posed. That the Code of 1869 went too far in "classifying and
 arranging the various subjects under appropriate titles" was
 the opinion of certain critics, who believed that it "was a de-
 cided success in the way of making the most out of the least ma-
 terial, being merely a labyrinth of reciprocating indexes, with
 headings so honey-combed into each other, that the explorer in-
 variably comes out the same hole that he went in at. As a stat-
 ute it is generally conceded to be a lamentable failure."32
 It is doubtful whether the above criticism of the Code of
 1869 by the editor of the Washington Standard was altogether
 fair and justifiable. Certainly the gentlemen appointed were
 both "discreet" and "learned in the law." In fact, the governor
 could hardly have chosen more capable commissioners than
 they. All three were able lawyers.33
 It does not appear that either Mr. Lasater or Judge Denni-
 son did any work on the revision of the laws. Judge Evans sub-
 mitted an individual report. In the meantime he had been elec-
 ted chief clerk of the House of Representatives, and on account
 of his work on the code report was also made clerk of a joint
 legislative committee on code revision. The result of his work
 was the enactment of the Code of 1869/* which engrafted at
 least one new feature upon the law of the territory, the Com-
 munity Property Law. It has been said that, because of the en-
 actment and inclusion of the Community Property Law, the
 32 Olympia Washington Standard, September 13, 1873.
 33 James H. Lasater of Walla Walla represented the first judicial district, El-
 wood Evans of Olympia, later of Tacoma, the second district, and B. F. Dennison
 of Port Townsend represented the third district. Judge Evans (although referred
 to as judge by all historians, the title was an honorary one only) was one of the
 most promising lawyers of the territory. He had been admitted to practice law in
 1852 at the first regular term of court held in Washington Territory, and already
 had been clerk of the Council, secretary of the territory, acting Governor, and later
 was to hold numerous other important public positions. Judge Dennison was at this
 time an associate justice of the Supreme Court. He had settled in Whatcom in 1850
 and at one time or another was a resident of nearly every important town in the
 territory. He was later to become the first president of the Washington State Bar
 Association when it was organized in 1889.
 34 Laws of Washington, 1868-69.
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 Code of 1869 was the most valuable code which had been adop-
 ed during the life of the territory.35
 The legislative session of 1868-69, filled with enthusiasm
 for code reform, proved to be a very busy one. The select joint
 committee on code revision accepted the report of Judge Evans
 as the basis of its work. He recommended a revision of the
 practice acts. To this, they prepared to add a revision of the
 general laws, to the end that a complete general codification of
 the laws of the territory might be obtained. To do this required
 that the laws of a general character be re-enacted. To re-enact
 these laws was a big task. Each had to be re-enacted in toto.
 The time had not come when the legislature was to feel free to
 embody the laws into a general compilation with consecutive
 section numbers and with titles and enacting clauses omitted.
 The ghost of 1854 and the interpretation of section six of the
 Organic Act were still before them.
 The plan of the select joint committee was to re-enact all
 existing statutes so that they might be incorporated into the
 Code of 1869. They assumed, and probably correctly, that Con-
 gress would appropriate money with which to pay the bill. Had
 not this been the intent of the act of January 29, 1868? Was
 this not the objective which Governor Moore had recommend-
 ed in his message of December 9, 1867? But Governor Moore
 had been succeeded by Governor Alvan Flanders, and Governor
 Flanders entertained a different view.
 On November 24, 1869, Governor Flanders addressed a
 message to both houses of the legislature in part as follows :36
 "I have received from your honorable body a large number of bills
 (not less than fifty) which have been sent in for my approval. All or
 nearly all of these bills are general laws which have been re-enacted as
 they now stand upon the statute books. These and many more of the
 same character, which have been passed by one or both Houses, or which
 are in the hands of the Select Joint Committee of your honorable body,
 and which have not yet been reported for your consideration, are of equal
 and perhaps greater importance than those that have been passed. The
 35 James Wickersham, "Life, Character, and Public Service of Elwood Evans.
 Pioneer, Lawyer, Governor and Historian," in Washington Historian (Tacoma,
 January, 1900), i, no. 2, 63.
 86 Journal of the House of Representatives, 1868-69, 406.
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 object to be attained in the re-enactment of these laws is to embody them
 into a code properly arranged and printed as such.
 "That this is desirable and perhaps necessary no one can doubt. But
 it is of far greater importance that, in the compilation and re-enactment
 of these laws, they be thoroughly examined, and that they receive the
 most critical revision and careful consideration at your hands. I think
 you will readily admit that the time bestowed upon those you have passed
 and that the time which now remains for the consideration of those here-
 after to come before you is entirely too limited for the exercise of that
 care which their importance demand.
 "This would create expense without attaining the purpose at which
 the codification of the laws aims. Among those which remain to be
 passed, are:
 An act in relation to practice and proceedings in civil actions.
 An act in relation to practice in the probate courts of W. T.
 An act in relation to crimes and punishments, and proceedings in
 criminal cases, and an act relating to Justices of the Peace and their
 practice and jurisdiction. A proper consideration of these laws alone,
 will require much more time than remains of the present session.
 "In view of these facts I would respectfully submit if it would not
 be wise and judicious to refer all these bills to a commission to 'revise,
 digest and codify the laws of the Territory* and report to the next legis-
 lature. . . .
 "It is much better that our laws should remain as they now are,
 than that their revision and re-enactment should be so hastily and imper-
 fectly done as to create the necessity of repeating the labor and expense
 of republication by a future Legislature."
 Again on the 27th of November, the governor sent an-
 other veto message to the legislature and at the same time re-
 turned twenty-nine additional bills without his approval. In
 further explanation of his action, he wrote :37
 "Nearly all these bills are simply re-enactments of laws as they now
 stand upon the statute books. A few of them have been altered and
 amended in some unimportant particulars, they are now in force in our
 Territory and are undoubtedly good laws. The object to be attained by
 their re-enactment is to have them printed as the laws of the present ses-
 sion of the legislature as a portion of what was to form the 'code.' Their
 publication would cost the government a large sum of money without
 any corresponding benefit. It is very probable that in the end the Terri-
 " Ibid., 430.
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 tory would be obliged to pay the bill. But whether paid by the Territory
 or the general government, it would be an expenditure of money which is
 not warranted at this time, and especially in view of the hasty and im-
 perfect manner in which the 'code/ of which the bills are a part, have
 been acted upon. It is doubtful if one of all the bills reported by the
 Select Joint Code Committee, and which have been passed, has been read
 in either House. In view of these facts I return these bills to the House
 from which I received them without my approval."
 Corroborating this interpretation of the legislative extrav-
 agance, Mr. Snowden has written in his History of Washing-
 ton that38 "... The changes which it [legislature] suggested
 were, for the most part, merely verbal, but to make them in le-
 gal form the acts in which they occurred were re-enacted. This
 made it necessary, or at least permissible, to have them reprint-
 ed for the use of the legislature, and thus greatly to increase
 the work and profits of the public printer. To this the governor
 objected, and vetoed the amended measures in batches."
 While the attempt to prepare a codification of the laws,
 which would embrace a revision of all existing law, was for the
 most part a failure, the Code of 1869, when it finally was adopt-
 ed, was a very substantial improvement over the previous at-
 tempts at codification. In the form in which it was enacted (the
 later Code of 1873 was almost identical with it) this Code was
 to remain in force until the codification of 1881.
 VI
 Common to each of the territorial codes of Washington
 from 1854 to 1869 inclusive, was a provision which abolished
 all distinctions between "actions at law" and "suits in chan-
 cery" and provided one form of action to be known as a "civil
 action." Such a statute had been incorporated into the laws of
 several of the territories created by Congress in the years be-
 tween 1845 and 1865, and represented a liberal interpretation
 of that section of their organic acts which provided that "The
 supreme court and the district courts, respectively, of every ter-
 ritory, shall possess chancery as well as common law jurisdic-
 tion."39 These territorial legislatures construed this grant of
 38 Snowden, iv, 183-84.
 ^Revised Statutes of The United States (Washington, 1878), second edition,
 section 1868.
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 power to mean that chancery and common law jurisdiction
 could be exercised jointly rather than severally.
 It will be recalled that under a similar section in the Or-
 ganic Act of Oregon Territory the code commissioners of 1853
 refused to make such an interpretation, notwithstanding the
 urgent plea of Commissioner Daniel R. Bigelow of Olympia,
 who wished then to combine equitable and legal relief in one
 proceeding.40
 When this legislative power came before the United States
 Supreme Court for review in a case arising in Montana, the
 court held that the territorial legislature had no power to pass
 an act depriving the territorial courts "of chancery as well as
 common law jurisdiction."41 This decision was rendered on
 May 1, 1871. Its effect was to render void the statutes of those
 territories which had abolished the distinction between proceed-
 ings in law and equity.
 As a result of this decision, the next session of the legis-
 lative assembly of Washington Territory, which convened on
 October 2, 1871, was forced to amend the code of civil proce-
 dure by enacting that, "All common law forms of action are
 hereby abolished, but the distinction between actions at law and
 suits in chancery shall be preserved; . . . "42 To effect such a
 change in the theory of civil practice without creating opposi-
 tion from some members of the bar was probably an impossi-
 ble task. At least, this was the effect of the amendments to the
 Code of 1869. While the Amendments had a few advocates,
 the majority of the bar felt that they were unreasonable and
 ought to be repealed. With a dissatisfied bar opposed to the
 Amendments of 1871, the possibility that further change and
 repeal would be made by the legislative session of 1873 was not
 unlikely. One of the leading newspapers of the territory edi-
 torially referred to the need for a new Code in clear and pre-
 cise language :43
 40 Beardsley, "Code Making in Early Oregon," 20.
 ^Dumphy v. Kleinschmidt, 78 U. S. 610, (20 Lawyer's edition, 223).
 42 Laws of Washington, 1871, 3.
 48 Olympia Washington Standard, September 13, 1873.
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 "The Civil Practice Act, or Code of Practice as it is sometimes called,
 it is agreed by the lawyers, demands amendment, repeal, codification or
 something else. The whole bar appears to be united in pronouncing our
 system of practice very defective and unsatisfactory. Without venturing
 any suggestions as to which system should receive the preference, we
 hope that our representatives will set themselves at work in earnest at
 the very commencement of the session upon this important matter, and
 at least lay the foundation of some system of practice upon solid princi-
 ples. Since the compilation of 1854, it can hardly be denied that every
 new one has in some particular been inferior to that which preceded it.
 The Statute of 1859 was only a partial reprint of 1854. The Statute of
 1863 was an improvement upon that of 1859, but in many respects in-
 ferior to that of 1854. The Statute of 1869 was a decided success in the
 way of making the most out of the least material, being merely a lab-
 yrinth of reciprocating indexes, with headings so honey-combed into each
 other, that the explorer invariably comes out the same hole that he went
 in at. As a statute it is generally conceded to be a lamentable failure. The
 practice act of 1871 is founded upon another system, which has many ad-
 vocates, and there are others who would prefer to see the old one re-
 stored. All its friends as well as its opponents, however, agree that as it
 now stands it is very defective, and if continued should undergo many
 changes."
 The sequence of events which followed the passage of the
 Amendments of 1871 presents an interesting but entangled re-
 lationship and one which does not lend itself easily to explana-
 tion.
 One of the first matters to be considered by the Legislative
 Assembly of 1873 which convened on October 6, was the ques-
 tion of revision of the laws of the territory and particularly the
 Amendments of 1871. As no code commission had been pre-
 viously authorized to prepare a proposed code, the legislature
 appointed a select code committee, consisting of the judiciary
 committees of both houses, to prepare a general compilation of
 the laws. This procedure was preferred to that of a revision of
 only the codes of civil and criminal procedure, probate, and jus-
 tice court as had been proposed by John P. Judson of Tacoma.44
 By October 25, the new practice bills together with about eighty
 smaller bills, which were to be embodied in the compilation of
 the laws, had been introduced into either branch of the legisla-
 44 Journal of the House of Representatives, 1873, newspaper report.
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 ture. On that date the Washington Standard hopefully com-
 mented upon the possibility of a new code: "From what we
 have seen and know of the matter, we feel happy in assuring
 the people of the territory of our belief that their represent-
 atives at this session will give them a compilation of the laws
 with needed amendments, that will be satisfactory and benefi-
 cial to the public at large."
 And further : "Our legislature will merit and receive the
 thanks of the public, if they succeed in presenting them with
 laws in one volume as the result of their labors at this session."
 When the legislative session was over45 the people found
 that the practice codes as embodied in the Code of 187346
 were almost verbatim re-enactments of the similar codes in the
 Code of 1869. This restored to the code of civil procedure the
 provision which had abolished the distinction between actions
 at law and suits in chancery, and which had substituted in place
 of these two forms of action - a civil action. Neither the legis-
 lative records nor the newspaper accounts of the proceedings of
 this session supply any explanation of why, in the light of the
 holding in the decision of Dumphy v. Kleinschmidt, supra, the
 legislative assembly should conclude that it had the power to
 adopt a statute providing for a single form of action. In re-
 pealing the Amendments of 1871, apparently the legislature
 had some knowledge of the principles involved in the case of
 Hornbuckle v. Toonibs - a second attempt made by the Mon-
 tana Territorial Legislature to establish its power to provide for
 a "single form of action" - which was then pending before the
 United States Supreme Court. This appeal had been presented
 to the court on December 9, 1873, less than one month after the
 Washington Territorial Legislature had re-enacted a code of
 civil procedure embodying this principle.
 Some idea of the feeling which had existed in the terri-
 tory against these Amendments of 1871 may be found in the
 following short paragraph taken from a decision by Mr. Jus-
 tice Greene in the case of Gallenton Hartsock v. C. G. Tyler
 which was tried in the second judicial district of the territory at
 45 November 13, 1873.
 46 Laws of Washington, 1873.
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 Olympia in April, 1877. Judge Greene expressed his personal
 feelings very fully in this long opinion from which these words
 are typical,47
 "These Amendments of 1871 were passed, as it were, under duress,
 in order that our territorial civil practice as part of a system finding its
 most authoritative exposition in its court of last resort, the Supreme
 Court of the United States, might be accommodated to the clearly an-
 nounced views of that ultimate tribunal. But hardly had the amendments
 been made before such counter opinions were rendered in the Supreme
 Court and such counter ruling action was held in Congress, as have made
 them entirely unnecessary [that] the very next legislature, therefore, re-
 pealed them."
 Five months were to elapse before the decision of the court
 in the appeal of Hornbuckle v. Toombs was to be handed down.
 During this interval a bill had been introduced into Congress,
 on February 4, 1874, with the purpose of authorizing territor-
 ial legislative sanction of the principle of the "single form of
 action." The bill was duly approved by Congress on April 7,
 1874; and in its form provided:
 "That it shall not be necessary in any of the courts of the several
 territories of the United States to exercise separately the common-law
 and chancery jurisdiction vested in said courts; and that the several codes
 and rules of practice adopted in said Territories . . . , in so far as they
 authorize a mingling of said jurisdictions or a uniform course of proceed-
 ing in all cases whether legal or equitable, be confirmed ; and that all pro-
 ceedings heretofore had . . . , be, and the same are hereby validated and
 confirmed: . . . "48
 The decision in the case of Hornbuckle v. Toombs fol-
 lowed less than a month later.49 Unequivocally overruling
 Dumphy v. Kleinschmidt , and two other similar decisions, the
 Supreme Court confirmed the power of the territorial legisla-
 ture, subject to the conditions of their respective organic acts,
 to merge the claims at law and in equity in one action.50 It is
 47 Elwood Evans' Scrapbook, 52. This scrapbook contains unreported decisions
 of the district court.
 4* The Statutes at Large of The United States, 1873-1875 (Washington, 1875),
 xviii, part 3, 27.
 « May 4, 1874.
 60 85 U. S. 648 (21 Lawyer's edition, 996).
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 a strange fact that the holding of the court was not based upon
 the Act of Congress of April 7, 1874, and does not seem in any
 way to contemplate it.
 While the records do not show that the justices of the Ter-
 ritorial Supreme Courts exercised any influence upon the pas-
 sage of the Act of Congress of April 7, 1874, it is not without
 possibility that such was the case. The records do show that at
 this time Mr. Justice Greene of the Supreme Court of Wash-
 ington Territory was carrying on a correspondence with the
 Judiciary Committee of the Senate concerning the passage of
 another act affecting the jurisdiction of Territorial Supreme
 Courts ;51 and reasoning by analogy, it is not improper to con-
 clude that a similar correspondence might have had some bear-
 ing upon the passage of the Act of April 7, 1874.52 Thus were
 settled the anomalous problems arising out of the Codes of 1871
 and 1873 respectively.
 VII
 As a climax to a quarter century of experimental code
 study, the Code of Washington, referred to from this point on
 as the Code of 1881, emerged as the ne phis ultra of territorial
 code making. The agitation for an amendment to the Code of
 1873 conformed to what seemed to have been the normal rou-
 tine of code making, viz., the adoption of a new code after the
 lapse of about two legislative sessions. In this respect, the Code
 of 1881 was no exception.
 Legislative revision of the Code of 1873 was proposed first
 in the session of 1877. The advocates of the code reform on
 this occasion sought not only the amendment of the Code of
 1873, but also that which had been sought continuously since
 1854, namely, the adoption of a completely classified and sys-
 51 Congressional Record (Washington, 1874), 11, part 4, 3585.
 52 Questions of exceedingly great interest are rasied by the speculation as to
 what attitude the Territorial Supreme Court would have taken toward appeals
 which might have come before it based upon the provision of the Code of 1873
 during the interim between November 13, 1873, when the legislature restored the
 Civil Practice Act of 1869 and the passage of the Act of Congress on April 7, 1874.
 Could the Court have found some basis for upholding the validity of the Civil
 Practice Act of 1873? It would be interesting to know to what extent private rights
 and remedies were affected by this practice act before the retroactive provisions
 of the Act of Congress became effective.
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 tematic code of laws of the present-day type. This concept of
 the type of the code desired is apparent from the title of the Act
 approved on November 9, 1877, being "An act to provide for
 the codification of the laws of Washington Territory."53
 Under the provisions of this act the codification was not to
 be limited to that of the practice act, as had been the case in the
 prior territorial codifications. The scope was to be much broad-
 er. The governor was "authorized and requested to nominate,
 and by and with the advice and consent of the Legislative
 Council of said Territory, to appoint a code commissioner who
 shall be a resident practicing attorney or judge of the Supreme
 Court of the Territory." Doubtless the writer of this section
 had familiarized himself with the phraseology of the provisions
 of the Constitution of the United States which relate to presi-
 dential appointments (Art. II Sec. 2), and desired through an-
 alogy to embody those principles into this section of the act. It
 was exceedingly unusual language and had never been used in
 any of the enabling acts which had provided for codifying the
 laws of either Oregon or Washington territories.
 The language of this enabling statute is pertinent to a
 satisfactory study of the type of code which the legislature pro-
 posed to enact. Several of the sections are as follows :
 Section 2. The said code commissioner so appointed, is hereby au-
 thorized and required to collate and thoroughly revise and codify all the
 statute laws of the Territory of Washington which are, or may be, in
 force at the close of the present session of the legislature. For this pur-
 pose, it is hereby made the duty of said code commissioner to group to-
 gether all correlative and similar statutes, classifying and arranging the
 various subjects under appropriate amendments into the original acts, re-
 jecting all repealed, redundant, inoperative and obsolete sections, laws, or
 parts of laws ; and furthermore, to make such alterations and amend-
 ments as shall reconcile all contradictions, correct and supply omissions
 in figures, letters, words and sentences ; and, to do and perform all other
 needful acts as shall enable the said code commissioner effectually to re-
 duce and bring into a written, intelligible and systematic form, the statute
 laws of this Territory.
 Section 3. That it shall be the duty of the said code commissioner
 in codifying and arranging the laws under proper parts, titles, divisions
 53 Laws of Washington, 1877, 235.
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 and subdivisions, under the provisions of this act, to complete and perfect
 the same, that such code of laws shall be made to cover and embrace the
 whole body of substantive law of the Territory of Washington. The said
 code shall be arranged and presented by the code commissioner under
 four general parts, or divisions, substantially, as follows :
 I. The Political Code of Washington
 II. The Civil Code of Washington
 III. The Code of Civil Practice
 IV. The Penal Code Embracing the Code of Criminal Procedure.
 Section 4. The said code commissioner is hereby further authorized
 and empowered to prepare a brief syllabus to each of the several laws,
 and subdivisions and titles of law, in said codification, together with such
 concise and appropriate marginal notes for, and to, the various sections,
 as shall afford easy and ready reference to all distinctive points and sub-
 jects embraced therein ; and furthermore, to prepare such annotations, or
 "foot notes," furnishing references to decisions, and correcting seeming
 contradictions in the laws, as shall be deemed useful and expedient.
 Section 5. The laws so revised, codified and arranged by the code
 commissioner appointed in pursuance of the provisions of this act, shall,
 when published, be embraced in one or more volumes of convenient size,
 and shall be known as the Washington Code and no other title by legal
 reference shall be necessary for their designation.
 Other sections made provision for the code commission-
 er's compensation in such an amount as the legislative assembly
 should fix, and required that he take an oath of office, an act
 which had never been required of any preceding code com-
 missioner.
 Only five days elapsed after the passage of this act until
 the legislature adjourned sine die. Apparently this was an in-
 sufficient period of time in which to allow the governor to select
 the code commissioner, and to get his appointment confirmed
 by the council. Nothing was done about the appointment, and
 the proposed codification did not materialize.
 The bill was reintroduced into the legislative session of
 1879 and was passed with but few changes.54 The first section
 was changed so as to provide for the appointment of Governor
 Elisha P. Ferry as code commissioner, and he was directed to
 "make such additions as may be thought necessary for a com-
 54 Laws of Washington, 1879, 90-92.
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 píete and perfect code for the Territory of Washington"55 and
 to submit the same in printed form.56 He was to receive a fixed
 salary of seventy-five dollars per month instead of the uncer-
 tain amount provided in the Act of 1877. Before the work was
 completed, this provision was to become the basis of a bitter
 controversy.
 Governor Ferry was regarded as an admirable choice for
 the duties of code commissioner. He was an able lawyer and
 was just completing his second four-year term as governor. It
 was believed that he would compile an acceptable code and for
 that reason was given the unusual power to "make such addi-
 tions as may be thought necessary." Such a grant of power
 was tantamount to authority to alter or change any existing
 laws and to interpolate them indiscriminately, making him al-
 most a modern Solon or Lycurgus.
 One code writer has said that the inclusion of such lan-
 guage is mere verbal extravagance. No codifiers would attempt
 to make such changes, well knowing that some legislator would,
 before final passage by the legislature, enter objections de-
 signed to render futile the plan of the codifier to interpolate the
 statute.
 Whether Governor Ferry felt constrained to exercise the
 full measure of the authority granted to him by the legislature
 is doubtful. There is reason to believe that he did nothing more
 than lend his name to the proposed compilation, and that such
 work as was done was performed by his clerks, John P. Jud-
 son, Patrick P. Carroll, and U. M. Rasin respectively. Certain
 critics of the governor openly charged that, although the code
 would not be completed, he would nevertheless make a claim
 for the "clerk hire." The criticism of the governor went fur-
 ther and suggested that "the legislature . . . put the codification
 in the hands of a competent and willing man and pay him for
 his services."
 This attack upon the governor was answered by the Puget
 Sound Courier, quoting in part articles in other papers,57 with
 « Section 2.
 56 Section 6.
 57 Palouse (Wash.) Washington Gazette, reprinted in the Olympia Washington
 Transcript, and answered by the Olympia Puget Sound Courier, September 16, 1881.
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 a bitter denial that Governor Ferry would ask payment for
 clerk hire in codifying the laws. "It comes," says the editor,
 "with poor grace from the Hopkins family, father or son, to
 attempt to cast slurs upon ex-Governor Ferry. Besides being
 an act of base ingratitude, it is unsafe for them to do so."58
 The newspapers which were unfriendly to the former gov-
 ernor were not alone in their conviction that no code would be
 forthcoming. The legislative message of Governor Newell
 hints that the governor himself entertained such a feeling. In
 addressing the legislative session of 1881, he said: "My dis-
 tinguished, immediate predecessor in the executive chair, was
 appointed to codify the laws of the territory. I am not in-
 formed that he contemplates presenting a report at this session,
 or at any future time/'59
 Governor Newell seemed to feel that the codification of the
 laws had not gone forward in the way that the legislative ses-
 sion of 1879 had intended. He referred to the matter in his
 message of October 3, 1881, and stated that he believed, "Suit-
 able arrangement and classification of the laws would simplify
 the administration of justice, and conduce to a large reduction
 of the cost of litigation to the citizens," and concluded with the
 remark, that the "codification should not be abandoned."60
 The legislature, in turn, was skeptical as to what, if any-
 thing, had been done by the code commissioner in preparing a
 code for their consideration. On the fourth day of the session
 a resolution was passed appointing a committee of five mem-
 bers - three from the house and two from the council - to "as-
 certain and report as soon as possible, the best method of re-
 vision and codification of the Washington Territory Statutes,
 and also whether it would be advisable to undertake either, or
 both, during this session."61 No record now exists as to what
 report this committee made, but as the revision was actually
 accomplished, it is obvious that their report must have recom-
 mended that favorable action should be taken.
 58 Lazvs of Washington, 1881, 201, 210. The records do not show that Governor
 Ferry ever received any compensation for his services but the clerks were each al-
 lowed three hundred and sixty dollars.
 59 Olympia Pug et Sound Courier, October 3, 1881.
 60 Ibid.
 61 Laws of Washington, 1881, 248.
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 It is now impossible to know what, if any, work had been
 done on the codification by former Governor Ferry or his cleri-
 cal assistants prior to the opening of the session of 1881. By
 the opening of the fourth day of the session no code had been
 submitted to the legislature, and apparently no word had been
 received as to the possible submission of such a code. It is prob-
 able, however, that some work had actually been done, because
 the clerks selected by Commissioner Ferry continued to serve
 the legislature throughout the entire session.
 The work of code revision was placed in the hands of a
 special legislative committee consisting of the House and Coun-
 cil committees on the Judiciary, Counties, and Printing - sev-
 enteen gentlemen in all.62 Of these, five were attorneys ;63 while
 the other members represented the various interests of the ter-
 ritory.64
 After the legislature had been in session for nearly one
 month and the character of its program had become known, a
 letter was printed in the Seattle Post-Intelligencer of Novem-
 ber 5, 1881. Its object was to advise the legislature as to the
 feeling of the people in regard to the prospects of a new code,
 and to urge that their civil and political rights should be pro-
 tected. The writer of the letter, G. M. Haller, a prominent at-
 torney of Seattle and associate of the late Judge Thomas
 Burke, was doubtless sincere in his suggestions, but he could
 hardly have hoped that the legislature would consider his com-
 ments, notwithstanding the logic which the arguments pre-
 sented. In the end, however, much of what Mr. Haller had
 suggested was actually accomplished.
 "We are advised/' said he, "that the legislature now in session is
 about to give us not only a new civil and criminal code, but a compilation
 and codification of all the existing laws of Washington Territory, now
 scattered through the diverse statutes from 1854 to 1879, and to that end
 have formed an able Judiciary Committee, which committee has called to
 its aid a corps of lawyers in the capacity of clerks, and we, the people,
 62 House : J. A. Kuhn, Stephen Judson, W. W. Holcomb, W. S. Smith, James
 A. Karr, G. F. Raymond, R. R. Reese, Albert Van Eaton, W. G. Preston, Thomas
 Warman, Orin Kincaid, R. P. Steen ; Council : Elwood Evans, B. L. Sharpstein,
 Jacob Hoover, J. W. Graden, J. H. Long.
 63 Kuhn, Sharpstein, Evans, Hoover, Holcomb.
 64 Message of Governor Newell to the legislature, December 7, I00I, as re-
 ported in the Seattle Post-Intelligencer, December 13, 1881.
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 are promised not only a complete compilation but also many improve-
 ments in both the civil and criminal codes of our territory. The vast and
 important consequences following such a step and the actual relation
 which any interference or unsettlement of existing and known law has
 to the advancement and prosperity of our country is my apology for the
 following remarks, and if any suggestions herein contained can assist
 the learned gentlemen having the matter in charge I shall feel fully re-
 paid, or if these matters have been thought of and provided for, this will
 at least do no harm, and the people may more easily see the dangers in
 which their rights of personal liberty, personal security, and private prop-
 erty necessarily are involved in a hasty attempt to change or remodel long
 existing laws whose meaning has become partially known and settled by a
 long course of judicial decisions, following a cost of thousands of dollars
 to the people in expensive and vexatious litigation.
 "I use the word hasty, not in the sense of reflecting upon the work
 of the commission or its clerks, which will be done with all the care and
 skill that the time will allow, and the character and high legal ability of
 its members will insure, but the legislative session can only last 60 days.
 The work was not begun until some days after the convening of the as-
 sembly. It must necessarily be completed some weeks before the close of
 the session to give the executive time to consider its provisions. So that,
 one may safely say that 30 or 40 days is all the time that can be spared
 for its completion. When we think what eminent judges and lawyers have
 shrunk from the like attempt to be completed in two years, we must mar-
 vel at the sublime courage of the committee now in charge of this work.
 But supposing the work is done and ready for final action of the assem-
 bly, there will have to be a repealing clause or else it will be no codifica-
 tion. How is that to be made? A complete repeal of all previous laws
 will wipe out all not contained in the new book. Is it within the power of
 man to incorporate, adjust, reconcile and present all the laws on perhaps
 vital questions of property, or the conduct of our affairs, or the protection
 of our persons or lives? If the repeal is only a repeal of all laws incon-
 sistent or conflicting with the new ones, then we are where the com-
 mittee began, for we must search through all the old laws and compare
 them to discover which are inconsistent.65
 "Further, a repeal of the criminal practice act without a saving of
 all pending prosecutions will be a general jail delivery; the law against
 which the criminal offended being no longer in force, he cannot be held
 for an offense against an ex post facto law. So an unguarded repeal of the
 civil code may oblige every poor suitor either to begin action over again,
 no matter at what stage it is before judgment, or if on appeal, may quash
 the appeal.66
 65 Covered by the Code of Washington, 1881, sections 3319 and 3320.
 ™lbid., sections 1296 and 761.
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 "Yet all these latter matters may be, and no doubt will be regarded
 by the learned gentlemen who have the work in charge. But there is an-
 other matter equally important which may be overlooked. It has been
 the custom of the assembly of Washington Territory, that their laws,67
 and especially the codes passed heretofore, (I believe with few excep-
 tions) shall go into effect from and after their passage. This act will
 probably pass about the end of the month of November, and it will not
 be possible for the territorial printer to furnish the people with the copies
 until May or June of next year, so that until that time the whole bar and
 especially the people will be in almost complete ignorance of what the ex-
 isting law really is.68
 " . . . Until then the whole judiciary and bar will be working in the
 dark, perhaps their whole work wrong, and destined to be blasted under
 the first light of the new law. In the meantime rights without number
 may be sacrificed and wrongs unwittingly done. Why then would it not
 be well to provide that this new revision shall not go into effect in any
 of its provisions until August 1, 1882? That will give time for the print-
 ing, circulation, and reading of the law, and enable the several courts to
 try their cases, and the Supreme Court to correct errors under the ex-
 isting order of things. ..."
 The work of the regular session moved slowly, and, when
 the sixty days were almost passed, it became certain that the
 code could not be finished. Considerable talk of an extra ses-
 sion was heard around the legislative halls, but many legislators
 were of the opinion that an extra session would lack lawful
 sanction. The governor himself was in doubt of his power to
 convene the legislature, notwithstanding the provisions of the
 Organic Act (section II)69 which stated that "the governor
 shall have power to call the legislative assembly together by
 proclamation, on an extraordinary occasion, at any time." He
 felt that he was between two fires because an earlier statute
 had provided that "no session of the legislature of a Territory
 shall be held until federal appropriation for its expenses had
 been made."70 Another section of the law71 obligated the Con-
 gress to appropriate four thousand dollars for the expenses of
 67 Mr. Haller was in error in this regard. See Laws of Washington, 1868, 53,
 which fixed the time as sixty days from the adjournment of the legislature.
 68 The Secretary of Territory s certificate appended to the Lode of loöl is
 dated May 24, 1882.
 69 Revised Statutes of The United States (Washington, 1878), second edition,
 section 1923.
 to Ibid., section 1886.
 71 Ibid., section 1887.
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 the territorial legislature, but until these expenses had been
 voted the governor felt that the legislature would have no valid
 status.
 At this point the governor transmitted to the legislature
 a message72 in which he advised the legislature, that with the
 special permission of the President73, he would reconvene the
 legislature in special session at the close of their present ses-
 sion, in order that they should have more time to consider the
 revision and codification of the territorial laws, which obvious-
 ly would not be completed before adjournment of the regular
 session. At that time but six days remained for the legislative
 consideration of bills, and the revision had progressed too far
 to permit its failing for want of sufficient time for its full
 consideration. The governor expressed the opinion that much
 disadvantage and disappointment would ensue if the codifica-
 tion were not completed.
 A few days later (November 30) the governor received an
 unsolicited letter from Chief Justice Roger Greene, of the Terri-
 torial Supreme Court, which he in turn communicated to the
 legislature.74 Judge Greene's advice, much in the nature of an
 advisory opinion by the court, was for the purpose of assuring
 the governor, as he said, "that there is no occasion to doubt
 your authority to call the extra session, or the plenary power
 of the legislature to make laws when met." The chief justice
 supported his opinion by referring to a section of the Organic
 Act, which authorized this procedure even in the face of a con-
 flicting statute, and pointed out that the prior statute had been
 qualified by the Organic Act which had been subsequently en-
 acted into law.
 Supported by the letters from the Secretary of the Inter-
 ior and Judge Roger Greene, Governor Newell addressed a
 lengthy message to the legislature on December 2, convening
 them in extra session, at the expiration of the regular session.
 In his message to the legislature the governor again explained
 his reasons for calling the extra session, and enumerated the
 72 Journal of the House of Representatives, 1881, 235.
 73No authority for this procedure for the presidential power has been located.
 74 Journal of the House of Representatives, 1881, 333.
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 important laws passed by the legislature which were to be em-
 bodied into the new codification, and concluded his message by
 stating that "Several important measures remain to be consid-
 ered in connection with the revision which in addition to those
 here designated, when adopted, will necessitate and justify the
 publication in one volume of the revised statutes of Washing-
 ton Territory. ..."
 Among the first bills introduced into the Extra Session of
 1881 was one providing for the publication of the Code in the
 territory. Although considerable opposition to this bill devel-
 oped, the bill finally was passed, and the Code was printed by
 C. B. Bagley, the public printer of the territory. An interest-
 ing comment on this legislative squabble is taken from one of
 the newspapers of that day.75
 "Governor Newell has issued his proclamation calling for a special
 session of the legislature for the purposes of completing the codes, to re-
 main in session not more than 20 days. Congress appropriated $3,000 for
 printing the codes. Hon. Elwood Evans introduced in the council, a bill
 directing the Secretary of the Territory to have the code printed in the
 Territory. This bill does not suit Bancroft & Co., of San Francisco,
 who, wishing the $3,000, have sent an agent to Olympia to lobby against
 it. Mr. C. B. Bagley, of the Olympia Courier, also wants to print the
 codes, and in the shape of a circular, offers to do the work on very
 reasonable terms and in a short time. 'We fully and heartily agree with
 Mr. Bagley that Mr. Evans' bill is correct in principle, as it provides that
 the people's money shall be spent among the people from whom it was col-
 lected. If Mr. Evans' bill passes, the greater part of the $3,000 will go
 to pay printers in the territory for the type-setting, presswork, and me-
 chanical labor of the book.' The idea that a few dollars can be saved
 tc the Government by allowing any printers out of the territory to print
 the codes should not weigh an atom against the bill. We know there are
 printing offices in the territory able to do the work in as good a style as it
 can be done elsewhere. We hope that Mr. Evans' bill passes both houses
 unanimously."
 The extra session concluded its labors on Wednesday, De-
 cember 7, 1881. Shortly before adjournment the governor dis-
 patched to the legislature a message of good will in which he
 summarized and praised their work. He called attention to the
 fact that many incongruous, obsolete and inoperative statutes
 75 Walla Walla Union, December 3, 1881.
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 had been repealed and that the entire task was necessary to an
 intelligent, proper and economical administration of justice. In
 conclusion, he said, "I commend the result to the candid, tem-
 perate and unbiased judgment of the people as a work of skilled
 and intellectual labor, embodying the principles of sound law,
 drawn largely from the most moderate jurisprudence, and un-
 precedented in that the burden of its preparation was self-im-
 posed and performed without pay. . . . "76
 VIII
 The manner in which the Code of 1881 was built, and the
 form which it finally received are stories none too well known.
 The many questions which might be asked concerning it cannot
 now be answered. Only the House Journal was printed for this
 legislative session and it is not particularly helpful to a study of
 this Code. The histories of the state throw no light upon this
 codification; and the newspapers are sadly lacking in editorial
 comments thereon. What was the character of the Code of
 1881 and how was it planned? How did it differ from the
 Codes which preceded it ?
 With the aid of the revising clerks - John P. Judson, Pat-
 rick P. Carroll, and U. M. Rasin - the select code committee of
 the legislature began the work of revision and codification, util-
 izing such work, if any, as had been done by Commissioner
 Ferry and his assistants before the opening of the legislative
 session. The enrolled laws on file in the office of the Secretary
 of State, at Olympia, indicate that the legislature, itself, began
 the work of revising the laws then in force and of working
 them into a tentative compilation. That this was the case is also
 shown by the consecutive section numbers for the Civil Prac-
 tice Act and the Criminal Practice Act, which are the first two
 acts in the Code of 1881. The sections of each of these acts
 were numbered from one to the end of the act. In addition to
 these numbers for the sections of these two acts, the legislature
 had also affixed consecutive code section numbers beginning
 with the first section of the Civil Practice Act and ending with
 76 Seattle Post-Intelligencer, December 13, 1881.
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 the last section of the Criminal Procedure Act. This is illus-
 trated by the first section of the Criminal Procedure Act which
 is No. 1 of the act in question and No. 764 of the Code.
 At this point, because of the shortage of time, the legisla-
 ture decided to devote its efforts to revision, and to leave the
 work of compilation to John P. Judson. In one of the final sec-
 tions (3322) of the Code the legislature provided that John P.
 Judson should be appointed to index the Code and prepare it
 for publication.
 In preparing the Code for publication the compiler was di-
 rected to use all possible haste. He was directed to strip the
 acts of their titles, enacting clauses, and clauses indicating time
 of taking effect; and to give to the sections consecutive code
 section numbers (section 3323). He was empowered to ar-
 range the subject matter into chapters, and to give headnotes
 and catchwords to the chapters and sections. While he was au-
 thorized to correct errors and omissions in the texts of the laws,
 he was prohibited from altering or changing the law in any
 way (section 3322).
 In the light of the direction contained in section 3323, re-
 quiring the compiler to strip the acts of their respective titles,
 much confusion has resulted from his failure so to do with the
 first act in the Code. For some unknown reason he included the
 title to the Civil Practice Act, being "An act to regulate the
 practice and proceedings in civil actions." This title has the
 appearance of being the title to the entire Code, whereas it is
 the title to the first act only. If it were to be construed as the
 title to the Code, treating the Code as one single act, the whole
 codification would have been invalidated by the provisions of
 section 6 of the Organic Act. It was probably included in the
 compilation through inadvertence, and must not be regarded as
 having any legislative significance.
 It is not generally understood that the Code of 1881 is an
 official legislative code. Each and every law contained in it was
 re-enacted in its entirety at either the regular or extra session
 of 1881. The Code provided that, in so far as its provisions
 were identical with the prior acts, the code provisions were to
 be construed as continuations of such laws and not as new en-
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 actments (section 3319). In an early decision77 the Supreme
 Court of Washington construed this section in the exact words
 of the statute, holding that its language clearly expressed the
 meaning intended and that in effect the Code of 1881 was not
 a compilation of laws, but the old laws in a new form. Wherev-
 er the provisions of the Code of 1881 differ from prior acts of a
 general nature relating to the same matter, the code provisions
 are made to prevail, and the prior acts are thereby repealed
 (section 3319). In those cases where the Code has omitted acts
 of a general nature in force at the beginning of the session of
 1881 and not otherwise repealed, such laws are continued in
 full force and effect (section 3320), unless they are repugnant
 to other acts upon the same subject passed or revised at the
 regular or extra sessions of 1881.
 The Code designated the classes of acts which were to be
 excluded from, as well as those which were to be included in,
 the published volume. Some were not to be codified, but were
 to be printed only in the Session Laws of 1881. These were to
 be the laws which related to appropriations, cities, towns, coun-
 ties, and acts of a private, local, and temporary character. Or-
 dinarily the bound volume of the session laws for a particular
 session includes all laws passed at that session ; but the Session
 Laws of 1881 omitted all laws included in the Code for the rea-
 son that they had been embodied into the codification.
 If the bound volume of the Session Laws of 1881 be ex-
 amined, several interesting features will be observed. Some of
 the acts included in it relate to matters which were to have been
 included only in the Code of 1881 as provided in section 3321.
 They were, however, placed in both places. These acts are
 amendatory of prior acts relating to practice in civil actions,
 probate, and the justice of the peace, and were passed and ap-
 proved early in the regular session. In view of their general na-
 ture, it is not clear why they were placed in the session laws.
 If the provisions of these acts be compared with the corres-
 ponding provisions of the Code, many variations will be noted,
 the explanation of which rests in the fact that these acts did not
 tiLiUell and Smythe Manufacturing Company v. Miller, (1892), 3 Wash. 480,
 28 Pac. 1035.
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 represent the last word of the legislature upon the matters in-
 cluded therein. The prior acts (Code of 1873) were amended
 by these same laws, but, before the Code of 1881 was complet-
 ed, the separate acts comprising it were again amended before
 final passage so that the acts, which went into the Code of 1881
 varied from the acts which were put into the session laws for
 that year. Such changes were doubtlessly made from the floor
 of the legislature and were in effect amendments to the acts
 previously passed during the same session. This explanation
 can be established by the dates on the enrolled bills on file in the
 office of the Secretary of State at Olympia. It is evident that,
 for at least two reasons, these acts should not have been in-
 cluded in the session laws. First, the acts fell within that group
 of subjects which were to be codified, and secondly, the session
 laws as printed did not represent the final expression of the
 legislative will upon the subject matter in question. In at least
 one instance the original law, as found in the Session Laws of
 1881, was placed in the Code as a footnote section,78 although
 this original act had been later amended before the final pas-
 sage. In this instance the footnote section was inaccurate and
 misleading.
 Reference has been made to footnote sections in the Code
 of 1881. These footnote sections indicate laws which were in-
 advertently omitted by the compiler from the Code/9 and which
 by the compiler's instructions, and the joint certificate of the
 Secretary of the Territory and himself, were required to be in-
 cluded. Since the Code at this time had been printed, these ad-
 denda could not be embodied within the Code and given con-
 secutive section numbers. If the comparison of the proof sheets
 with the enrolled bills had been made in accordance with the
 intent of section 3323, these footnote sections could have been
 properly inserted and consecutively numbered accordingly.
 Not many of these footnote sections are to be noted ; however,
 nine sections follow the provisions of the Civil Practice Act,
 and two sections follow the Criminal Practice Act. No others
 have been located. They are equivalent to lost sections because
 78 Code of Washington, 1881, section 1196. See footnote reference on page 230
 of the Code : also Session Laws of 1881, 29.
 79 See pages 156 and 230 respectively.
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 they were not indexed in the Code; nor were they placed in
 Bagley's Supplement to the Code of 1881, which was published
 a short time thereafter.
 Statutory direction provided the plan of arrangement and
 content of the subject-matter of the Code.80 The compilation
 was to include:
 First, the Constitution of the United States, and the amendments
 thereto.
 Second, The Organic Act and other acts of Congress applicable to
 Washington Territory.
 Third, The Naturalization Laws.
 Fourth, All acts of a general nature revised and amended, or en-
 acted at the eighth regular and extra sessions of the legislature.
 No directions were made in this section concerning the ar-
 rangement of the statutes within division four, but section 3322
 required the compiler to arrange and classify them in such
 manner as he thought desirable.
 In his arrangement of the contents of the Code, the com-
 piler followed the order of the statute (section 3322) ; but the
 classification of the statutes within division four was borrowed
 from the prior codes. The first subdivision of the statutes is
 that of Civil Procedure, followed by Criminal Procedure, the
 Probate Practice Act81 and the Justice Practice Act respective-
 ly. The final subdivision of the statutes bears the caption "Mis-
 cellaneous" and contains all the statutes not of a procedural na-
 ture. The entire Code (aside from the first three divisions) is
 again divided into two hundred and fifty-six chapters numbered
 in Roman, each with its own individual caption. The caption
 relating to school law (chapter 245) being a very long one is
 further divided into titles.
 Under the authority of the Acts of 1877 and 1879 provid-
 ing for the compilation of the statutes the compiler was to pre-
 sent the Code under four divisions substantially as follows :
 80 Code of Washington, 1881, section 3325.
 81 Some copies of the Code of 1881 have, through error, repeated the caption
 Justice Practice Act for the caption Probate Practice Act.
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 1. The political code.
 2. The civil code.
 3. The code of civil procedure.
 4. The penal code including the code of criminal procedure.
 The Code of 1881, itself, specified four divisions, one of
 which was to include all four of those listed in the Act of 1879.
 This fourth division of the Code of 1881 was in turn so subdi-
 vided as to take care of the Codes of Civil Procedure and Crim-
 inal Procedure (including the penal code, which left the divi-
 sions of civil code and political code to be incorporated under
 the caption of "Miscellaneous." It is, therefore, apparent that
 the plan of arrangement suggested to the code commissioner
 in 1879 was more logical than the plan finally adopted, and, had
 Commissioner Ferry been more active in performing the duty
 for which he was chosen, a more systematic compilation of the
 law might have been forthcoming. It is not clear as to where
 he would have placed the Probate Practice Act, but possibly it
 could have been included in the division of Civil Procedure.
 Most of the acts passed by the legislative sessions of 1881
 carried emergency clauses which provided that, "This act shall
 take effect and be in force from and after its passage and ap-
 proval." Some acts added the words "by the Governor" after
 the words relating to approval, but in every such instance
 where not so added, the words were obviously implied. The
 practice of indicating emergencies so as to make the statutes
 immediately effective is a common one ; but it is also one which
 is badly abused. In the absence of any reference as to when
 statutes shall become effective the presumption is that they
 shall take effect immediately,82 unless there be a constitutional
 or statutory provision to the contrary. The policy of providing
 that all acts, not otherwise declared to be emergent, shall take
 effect sixty or more days after adjournment of the legislature
 is also a common one. In fact, such a policy is controlled by a
 constitutional provision in most states.83 No such provision was
 82 Some acts passed in 1854 and subsequent sessions of the territorial legisla-
 ture contained emergency clauses which made them immediately effective. Those
 which did not have such clauses became immediately effective under the rule of the
 presumption. Of what value then was the emergency clause?
 83 Washington Constitution, article ii, section 31.
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 incorporated into the Organic Act of Washington Territory,
 although it might properly have been so included. In the ab-
 sence of any such restriction, the territorial legislature was free
 to enact a law fixing the time when general laws should become
 effective. This they did in 1868, in the following language:
 Section 1. "From and after the date of the passage of this act, all
 laws made and passed of a general nature shall not be deemed to have or
 take effect until sixty days after the sitting of the legislative session has
 expired, unless otherwise directed/'84
 This statutory provision being in effect at the time of the
 adoption of the Code of 1881 governed the date when the Code
 became effective. The laws enacted at the session of 1881 and
 comprising the Code became effective on February 7, 1882,
 about three and one-half months before the printed Code was
 distributed, unless they carried emergency clauses, and during
 that time the people of the territory had no means of knowing
 what laws were in force. No pamphlet laws were published and
 few newspapers printed more than bare references to the en-
 acted laws. This was one of the matters about which G. M.
 Haller had written to the Seattle Post-Intelligencer on Novem-
 ber 5, 1881.
 IX
 Few codes have been subjected to such a rigid judicial ex-
 amination and construction as that which the Code of 1881 re-
 ceived. Being an unique expression of the legislative will, it
 has raised many interesting, and no less complex, questions of
 statutory interpretation. The result has been two distinct the-
 ories of judicial construction and much dicta.
 It will be recalled that each of the Acts of 1877 and 1879
 provided that when the codification was completed and pub-
 lished, it should be known as the "Was hingt on Code/' The Leg-
 islature of 1881 reversed the words designating the title of the
 Code making it to read "Code of Washington Territory/' (Sec-
 tion 3325). The word territory was dropped when the title
 page of the Code was prepared, leaving the title of the Code as
 84 Laws of Washington, 1868, 53; Baglcy's Supplement, 16.
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 "Code of Washington." Reference has been made to the pop-
 ular designation of this Code as the "Code of 1881/' and as
 such it was subjected from time to time to judicial construction.
 The first two or three sessions of the territorial legislature sub-
 sequent to 1881 commonly referred to this Code by various des-
 ignations. It was not uncommon in the same session to intro-
 duce bills to amend the "Code of Washington," "Code of
 Washington Territory," "Washington Code," "Code of 1881,"
 and simply the "Code." The titles to many bills were in lan-
 guage similar to the following, "An act to amend section 3050,
 chapter 238, of the Code of Washington Territory/' and prior
 to the decision of the court in Harland v. Territory** decided in
 February, 1887 such titles were considered sufficient.
 In a lengthy opinion written by Mr. Justice Turner, the
 court held in the Harland case that a mere reference in the title
 of an act to the section of a code, which is to be amended by
 the act is insufficient and that such an amendatory act is void.
 The basis for this interpretation was that the Organic Act of
 Washington Territory, which stated that "every law shall em-
 brace but one object, and that shall be expressed in the title,"86
 did not permit such form of amendment.
 Judge Turner in his decision of Harland v. Territory set
 forth at some length his theory of the Organic Act, in support
 of his view, and quoted from many authorities. Among the ar-
 guments, he said that some statement of the purpose of a law
 must be included within the title of an amendatory act in or-
 der that the title may indicate the object of the proposed law.
 Such a statement might be very general or even meagre. To use
 the word "amend" is, he says, sufficient. Law-makers do not
 read the bills in full before they vote on them in session, al-
 though theoretically they are supposed to do so. Bills are
 passed with reference to title only. The words of purpose in the
 bill are there for their information and guidance. Referring
 specifically to the act, which proposed to amend the Code of
 1881, being "An act to amend section 3050, chapter 238, of
 the Code of Washington Territory/' Judge Turner said :
 85 3 Washington Territorial Reports, 131.
 86 Section 6; Revised Statutes of The United States (Washington, 1878), sec-
 tion 1924.
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 "It seems to me that it is paltering with the Act of Congress to say
 that the object of a particular law is to amend a section of the Code, and
 that the title is sufficient if it express that much. It would be equally ac-
 curate to say that the object of all penal laws is to secure the peace and
 good order of society, and that laws denouncing robbery, burglary, or
 larceny would have their object adequately expressed by the title, 'An Act
 to secure the peace and good order of society." The latter title goes as far
 beyond, as the former stops short of, expressing the true object. The ob-
 ject of an amendatory act is not to amend. Such a construction is too
 narrow ; it sticks in the bark. Legislatures do not amend simply with the
 object of amending; the object in every case is to introduce some new
 substantive rule of action by the new law, or to abrogate some such rule
 in the old law. It is attached to the old law because its provisions are sup-
 posed to be germane to that law. It might be enacted without reference
 to it; in which case its title would be required to give intimation of the
 new rule. What magic is there in the name 'amendment' which exempts
 a law to which it is tacked from the salutary provisions applicable to
 every other law?"
 The decision of Harland v. Territory grew out of several
 acts, one of which was designed to grant women the right of
 suffrage. It is generally conceded that Judge Turner was per-
 sonally opposed to the principle of permitting women to vote.
 That this had an effect upon his decision cannot be truthfully
 said, but the decision did, however, "disclose his natural bent
 in opposition to the policy of granting women the right of suf-
 frage."87 In the principles which it enunciated, it must be said
 to have held, that the Code of 1881 could not be amended by a
 mere reference, in the title of the amendatory act, to a section
 of the Code of 1881 , but that some words pertaining to the sub-
 ject of the section of the act to be amended must also be in-
 cluded.
 The decision was broad enough to effect the validity of all
 acts of the territorial legislature which attempted to amend the
 Code of 1881 in this manner.
 In a decision which arose after statehood,88 the Supreme
 Court applied the principles of Harland v. Territory and re-
 fused to hold a territorial statute valid which was, in effect, de-
 87 C. S. Reinhart, History of the Supreme Court of the Territory and State of
 Washington, 21.
 88 State v. Halbert (1896), 14 Wash. 306, 44 Pac. 538, 64 A. S. R. 80.
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 clared invalid by the holding of Harland v. Territory, on the
 theory that if the said statute was invalid, it could not be re-
 vived by that provision of the Constitution89 which holds that,
 "all laws now in force in the Territory of Washington which
 are not repugnant to this constitution shall remain in force un-
 til they expire by their own limitation, or be altered or repealed
 by the legislature. ..."
 The great antithesis of Harland v. Territory, and the de-
 cision which has been said with doubtful validity to specifically
 overrule it,90 was Marston v. Humes, decided in December,
 1891.91
 This decision involved the validity of an act passed by the
 legislature of 1891 entitled, "An act relating to pleadings in
 civil actions, and amending sections 76, 77, and 109 of the Code
 of Washington of 1881" In presenting the opinion of the
 Court, Mr. Justice Hoyt took issue with the philosophy of his
 colleague, Mr. Justice Turner. The question before the court
 at this time was, in simple language, whether the title of the act
 was broad enough to indicate the content of this act, as required
 by the provisions of the Constitution, which states that, "no bill
 shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be ex-
 pressed in the title/'92
 After subjecting the title of the act in question to the test
 of whether the object of the act was clearly expressed therein,
 the court decided that it was, inasmuch as the matter of va-
 cation of judgments was a part of the subject of pleadings, and
 the title stated that the act related to pleadings in civil actions.
 On the basis of this conclusion the court upheld the validity of
 the act in question. Having decided the question before it, the
 remainder of the opinion of the court must be regarded as
 dicta. In its holding in the case of State ex. rei Seattle Electric
 Co. v. Superior Court (1902), the court, referring to Judge
 Hoyt's opinion, said : "It is true, the learned writer of the opin-
 ion went further, and stated that ... a section of such Code
 may be amended by an act under a title which simply provides
 89 Washington Constitution, article xxvin, 2.
 »»Erickson v. Hodges (1910), 179 Fed. 177.
 91 3 Wash. 267.
 92 Washington Constitution, article n, section 19.
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 for the amendment of such section by its number, without any
 designation of the subject matter of the section to be amend-
 ed."93 This opinion was reaffirmed in a decision rendered by the
 court in the year following. In State v. Scott (1903) the court
 said: "True the court went further, and held in that case
 [Marston v. Humes] that the Code of 1881 could be constitu-
 tionally amended by a mere reference to its section numbers
 . . . "94 Both of these decisions seemingly are in accord with
 Marston v. Humes, but in reality they are only in accord with
 the dicta of this case.
 In the course of his opinion in Marston v. Humes, Judge
 Hoyt very apologetically referred to the necessity of a re-exam-
 ination of the reasoning in Harland v. Territory. His reasons
 may be summarized in the following manner :
 (a) The court was at that time divided equally upon the
 question,
 (b) One of the judges was incapacitated from sitting,95
 (c) Had the same case arisen in a different district of the
 territory, a contrary conclusion would have been arrived at,96
 (d) This court would not be justified in "blindly follow-
 ing and accepting as law" the decision of half of said court
 which constituted a majority of those sitting in that particular
 case.
 (e) That court was less favorably situated for a full in-
 vestigation of the question in the light of the authorities, than
 is this court.
 (f ) Very few books were accessible to the court in 1887.
 (g) That a large number of the cases cited are said to
 have been so cited from digests rather than from the cases
 themselves.
 (h) This court has had the opportunity to fully examine
 all the cases therein cited, and many more upon the same sub-
 ject.97
 93 28 Wash. 332, 68 Pac, 957.
 94 32 Wash. 279, 73 Pac, 365.
 95 Judge Hoyt.
 96 The reason was that the case had arisen in the judicial district over which
 Judge Hoyt presided.
 97 During the three years since Harland v. Territory was decided the Supreme
 Court Library must have been materially increased in size.
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 (i) The first decision was based upon the limitations of
 the Organic Act of the Territory; the Constitution of the State
 now controls, and the Court is free to interpret it without the
 limitations of the territorial decisions.
 The last reason which Judge Hoyt offers is in reality a
 begging of the question. Few people can distinguish the issues
 in these two cases ; the content of the provisions of the Organic
 Act and the Constitution is the same, although the wording dif-
 fers. Most courts would have felt that the arguments in Har-
 land v. Territory would have provided sufficient precedent for
 subsequent problems of similar scope. One cannot refrain from
 wondering whether the attitude of the court in the second case
 was not largely motivated by personal bias rather than the sin-
 cerity of judicial reasoning.
 One writer, untrained in legal science but supported by al-
 most forty-three years of service as clerk of the court, has said,
 and because of his intimate association with the history of the
 court, his comment is deserving of considerable respect, that
 in his opinion "Judge Turner's decision is much the more logic-
 al of the two, and, fortified as it is with subsequent decisions of
 this court, is without doubt the law at present."98
 Most students of the law regard the positions of the court
 in these two decisions as unsatisfactory. They are frequently
 heard to lament that the decisions are confusing. Some believe
 that Harland v. Territory has been "specifically overruled,"
 wThile others regard Harland v. Territory as still the law. They,
 who contend for the latter view, must inferentially regard both
 decisions as consistent, if not complementary. This conclusion
 becomes the more convincing when the actual holdings of the
 two decisions are compared.
 98 Reinhart, 22.
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 Harland v. Territory
 Question
 An act to amend section 3050
 of the Code of Washington Ter-
 ritory (Code of 1881).
 Decision
 Act void.
 Reasoning
 The title of the amending act
 did not contain any reference to
 the subject matter of act to be
 amended.
 Conclusion
 Inferentially this act, amend-
 ing a section of the Code of
 1881, would have been valid
 had the title contained some
 statement, however general or
 meagre, which would have giv-
 en some idea of the purposes of
 the act and the changes desired.
 Marston v. Humes
 Question
 An act relating to pleadings
 in civil actions, and amending
 sections 76, 77, and 109 of the
 Code of Washington of 1881.
 Decision
 Act valid.
 Reasoning
 The title of the amending act
 did contain a statement of the
 subject of the act to be amend-
 ed.
 Conclusion
 An act may amend a section
 of the Code of 1881 if the title
 contains a statement of the sub-
 ject matter of the act to be
 amended sufficient to give some
 idea of the purposes of the act,
 and the changes desired. In
 this case the act in question did
 contain such descriptive lan-
 guage.
 Thus, in effect, both decisions hold that a section of the
 Code of 1881 may be amended, providing the title of the
 amending act contains sufficient statement of the purpose of the
 amendment or gives a clear expression of the change in the law
 which the amendment will effect.
 Too frequently, the reader of judicial opinions, and the
 digester also, fails to distinguish between the actual holdings
 of a legal opinion and the learned dissertations or dicta, which
 such opinions frequently contain. The syllabi of the decisions
 contain frequent statements of dicta much too often accepted
 as statements of the law laid down in the decision. Such was
 the difficulty with the decision of Marston v. Humes. As an
 example of this confusion the reader will frequently note that
 Marston v. Humes is cited as authority for the rule (see sylla-
 bus) that "A section of the Code of 1881 may be amended by
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 an act under a title which simply provides for the amendment
 of such section by its number, without any designation of the
 subject matter of the section amended." Such a statement is
 pure dicta. The decision itself did not hold this.
 Undoubtedly Judge Hoyt intended to so hold, but the
 courts have not willingly accepted this broad statement of stat-
 utory construction," although frequent reference has been
 made to the language above quoted. To the casual reader the
 deductions of Judge Hoyt are convincing. Certainly the de-
 velopment of his thesis is a masterpiece of inductive reasoning,
 which must be read to be appreciated. The substance of his ar-
 gument upon the construction of the constitutional provision
 that "No bill shall embrace more than one subject, and that
 shall be expressed in the title" is worthy of further study.
 "How," he said, "Shall this provision be interpreted?" And in
 answer thereto, he said,
 "I am of the opinion that the legislature must be the judge of the
 scope which they will give to the word "subject," and that so long as the
 title embraces but one subject, it is not inimical to such constitutional pro-
 vision, even although the subject as thus used contains any number of
 subjects."
 Furthermore, he said,
 (a) That it cannot be contended, that a title would be void which
 provided that the enactment was to be upon the subject of "pleading."
 And,
 (b) If the term "pleading" is sufficient, then it must be competent
 for the legislature to enact as a single law a "code of civil procedure."
 And,
 (c) If the legislature can thus by a name sufficiently comprehensive
 embrace all subjects properly relating to civil procedure, it must follow,
 that, by adopting a subject sufficiently general, it can embrace in one act
 all the "statute law of the State."100 Furthermore,
 (d) If it is competent for the legislature to enact this entire body of
 laws under a single title, it must follow that an act to "revise or re-enact"
 the same would, upon familiar principles, be likewise valid. And finally,
 (e) If the whole act can be revised or re-enacted under one title, the
 same can be revised or re-enacted in part by way of amendments, provided
 the parts to be amended are specified in the title.
 99 State ex. rei. Seattle Electric Company v. Superior Court, supra 96.
 100 The legislature of Oregon Territory attempted this procedure in 1849. See
 Beardsley, "Code Making in Early Oregon," 10.
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 X
 Closely allied to that judicial interpretation which has
 made the Code of 1881, is the judicial definition and character-
 ization which has accompanied its interpretation.
 In the dicta of his concurring opinion in Harland v. Ter-
 ritory, Mr. Justice Langford subjected the Code of 1881 to
 severe condemnation and ridicule. With extraordinary con-
 tempt he said,
 "We have a book which is marked on the fly-leaf, 'The Code of
 Washington/ I have examined it, and find that it does not purport to con-
 tain any authenticated act of the legislature assembly of the Territory of
 Washington. It purports to have been edited and compiled by a private
 party. It contains no titles to acts, no enacting clause, no signature of
 president of the council, speaker of the house, or governor. It is not
 certified by the secretary to be or contain a true copy of any legislative
 act. The chapters, divisions, and sections all purport to be the act of a
 private party. His sections run up to 3327, and in the book is an unau-
 thenticated provision that a certain private party shall publish parts of a
 certain class of laws which he shall deem to be general, and leave out cer-
 tain parts of all acts, and leave out entirely others. He certifies that he
 has examined all the laws embraced in the volume (the Code), etc., and
 put redundant matter in parentheses, and matters omitted from enrolled
 laws but supplied by him are enclosed in brackets.
 "Now it is clear that this book contains no act passed by the legis-
 lative assembly, and it cannot be known officially what it does or does not
 contain. We suppose that this is the private book which the Act of 1883
 purports to amend."
 It is obvious that this characterization by Judge Langford
 is unfair and unjust. Certain comments are wholly inaccurate,
 while the whole tirade breathes of bias and prejudice. Need-
 less to say, his view of the character of the Code of 1881 was
 not entertained by the bar of the territory, nor by his associate,
 Mr. Justice Greene, who in his dissenting opinion, says, "From
 all that is decisive and much that is not decisive, ... I totally
 dissent, ..." The answer to this tirade of Judge Langford was
 made by Judge Hoyt in the course of his opinion in Marston v,
 Humes, By way of quest, he asked (at page 272), "Is there
 such a thing known to the law of this state as the Code of
 1881?" By way of answer, he said, "the proposition is too clear
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 for extended argument. . . . The legislature which revised and
 re-enacted the laws which now constitute such Code provided
 that the laws thus revised and re-enacted should be arranged
 and consecutively sectionized from the first to the last, and that
 such laws when so placed and numbered in a single body should
 constitute the Code, and I can see no reason why their will thus
 expressed should not have force. Besides from that time to
 this, the legislature by constant reference to said body of laws
 as the "Code of 1881/' have clearly shown their adoption of the
 same as such Code; and for the courts to hold that there was no
 such thing as the Code of 1881 would, in my opinion, do vio-
 lence to every rule of judicial interpretation of legislative acts."
 The above holding in language somewhat differently
 phrased is to be found as one of the points of the syllabus of the
 above case, and, in its syllabic form, this language has been
 cited with approval by the court in a number of later decisions.
 XI
 The legislature specifically provided that the laws of a gen-
 eral nature not repealed by the Code of 1881, were to continue
 in full force and effect. It was their intention that all such laws
 should be incorporated into the Code, The legislators did not
 intend that any laws of a general nature should be overlooked
 by the sessions of 1881. The purpose of the saving clause (sec-
 tion 3320) was to save any such laws which had been inadvert-
 ently omitted from the procedure of repassage in either the
 regular or extra session. It was the belief of the legislative
 committee that all such laws had been repassed ; and the mem-
 bers of the code committee did not realize that any had been
 overlooked; but, in fact, some seventy-seven general laws had
 been forgotten.
 After several months had elapsed, John P. Judson and El-
 wood Evans, both former members of the code committee of
 1881, prepared a compilation of these lawrs consisting of fifty
 pages including an index. The compilation was in the nature
 of a supplement to the Code of 1881, and follows somewhat the
 plan of the latter in omitting the titles of the acts. It was not
 arranged into sections as in the Code of 1881, but it listed the
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 dates of the laws which was a feature that the Code did not in-
 clude. The authority of these laws does not rest upon this sup-
 plement for their sanction, but upon the strength of the saving
 clause of the Code of 1881 (section 3320), which preserved
 them. It is not an official compilation like the Code and has nev-
 er received legislative approval.
 The supplement has come to be known as Bagley' s Supple-
 ment because it was printed by Clarence B. Bagley, then the
 state printer. In referring to the supplement by way of a pref-
 ace to the volume Mr. Bagley has said :101
 "The Legislative Assembly of 1881, in the enactment of the 'Code
 of Washington/ and the session laws of 1883, did not include many laws
 of a general nature, which, by the terms of the repealing clause of the
 Code, are still in force. These are scattered through the session laws,
 from 1855 down to date, and the following compilation is thought to in-
 clude all such laws of a general nature, not appearing in said Code of
 1881 and laws of 1883, but still in force in Washington Territory. The
 question may arise whether some of these laws have not been repealed,
 but as at present advised, they are thought not to be, and hence are in-
 cluded."
 There seem to be two distinct editions of the Supplement to
 the Code of 1881. The second edition, while not so marked,
 bears the imprint date of 1884. Since the contents of this edi-
 tion present some interesting variations, particular reference
 must be given to them.
 The 1884 edition contains two laws more than the 1881
 edition, but five laws are included in the 1881 edition which do
 not appear in the 1884 edition, and six laws are to be found in
 the 1884 edition which are not contained in the 1881 edition.
 These six laws of the 1884 edition are laws relating to county
 boundaries and were not passed until the legislative session of
 1883, which explains their absence from the 1881 supplement.
 Of the five laws contained in the 1881 supplement and missing
 from the 1884 edition, two were repealed by the 1883 legislative
 session, one was a temporary law which expired by its own
 terms in 1883, another was a statute which had been repealed
 prior to 1881 and was picked up and included through mistake.
 101 John P. Judson and El wood Evans, Laws of Washington Territory (Olym-
 pia, 1881), 2.
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 The last statute in question was probably omitted from the sup-
 plement of 1884, through inadvertence.
 XII
 As was true of all the territorial codes, the Code of 1881
 was not without its critics. The extent of the agitation for a
 new revision of the laws prior to the session of 1887 is not
 known, but that such a demand had strong political support is
 certain. In his message to the legislature of 1887, Governor
 Semplesaid:102
 'The laws of this territory, owing to careless legislation and deci-
 sions of the courts, are in such a state of confusion that it is very difficult
 even for experienced members of the bar to arrive at any definite con-
 clusion in regard to them, much less can a citizen exactly determine the
 rules that govern his conduct, or the laws that guarantee his rights and
 privileges. Consultation of our laws by our citizens is rendered still more
 difficult by the absence of anything that can properly be called an index to
 the volumes. To remedy these faults there seems to be a general desire
 for the codification of our statutes. I suggest that instead of a codifica-
 tion of our present law, a commission be created and instructed to pre-
 pare for submission to the next legislature a civil, a criminal, and a pro-
 bate code, being guided in their labors by an adherence to the spirit of
 our laws as heretofore instituted. It should also compile all general laws
 under a separate head, and provide a competent index for the whole
 system."
 The legislature regarded with approval the recommenda-
 tion of the governor relative to a code commission. House Bill
 No. 118, being "An act to provide for the appointment of a
 code commission," was introduced into the house on Monday,
 January 9, 1888, by T. J. V. Clark of Yakima County. The bill
 was referred to the Judiciary Committee which reported it out
 favorably on January 27. The proposal was approved by the
 House on that day, and by the Council on January 31, and was
 signed by the governor on February 2.103
 In the code commission act of 1877, the governor was to
 appoint as a commissioner either an attorney, or a judge of the
 102lValla Walla Union, December 17, 1887.
 MLaws of Washington, 1887-88, 44.
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 Supreme Court. By the act of 1879, the selection was limited
 to former Governor Ferry, an attorney of considerable promi-
 nence. Notwithstanding the failure that Governor Ferry made
 of codification in 1881, the legislature still had confidence in the
 legal profession. Perhaps this was due to the excellent service
 rendered by the select code committee in the legislative session
 of 1881, on which, there were nine attorneys.104 The fact re-
 mains, however, that in the Act of 1888 the governor was to
 appoint, not one attorney but four attorneys, residents105 of the
 territory who were then practicing law. Two of these appoint-
 ees were to belong to each of the "Great political parties." One
 may well wonder what importance party affiliation could have
 upon this task.
 The commissioners were to meet within thirty days after
 their appointment and enter upon the discharge of their duties
 (section 2). No oath was to be required. The duties as out-
 lined by the legislature were "to revise, codify and fully pre-
 pare a code of the laws of said Territory, having reference and
 adhering as closely as practable to our present system" (sec-
 tion 1 ) . In section 3 it was also provided that :
 "It shall be the duty of said commission to prepare in the best form,
 a code of laws for general use in said Territory, adhering as closely as
 may be proper and practicable to the present system and laws, and to ar-
 range the same logically and systematically under the proper headings
 and chapters supplying any omissions and imperfections that may now
 exist, at the same time adopting practical necessary forms of laws, and
 keeping in view the laws and forms, and arrangement of the same now in
 use, in the states and territories under the code system. Said code shall
 be fully prepared and shall be submitted in written or printed form to
 the next regular session of the legislature on the first day thereof."
 In consideration of their services, the commissioners were
 to receive seven dollars per day. They had the power to appoint
 a clerk at the rate of five dollars per day, (section 2) and for all
 expenses of service the legislature appropriated seven thousand
 dollars (section 4).
 104 Kühn, Evans, Hoover, Sharpstein, Judson, Rasin, Carroll, Comegys, Hol-
 comb.
 105 It is not clear why this word was inserted. Perhaps it was intended to refer
 to William Lair Hill who had published a code for Oregon in 1887. He was at this
 time a resident of California but was then preparing to move to Seattle.
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 As members of this code commission Governor Semple ap-
 pointed W. H. Doolittle of Tacoma, J. H. Snively of Yakima,
 T. H. Came of Seattle, and A. E. Isham of Walla Walla. Ban-
 croft has said,106 that as the "passage of the enabling act107 ren-
 dered it undoubted that the state constitution would differ ma-
 terially from the organic law of the territory, the commission
 suspended its labors until the state constitution has assumed
 definite form, when it revived its work."
 What, if anything, was accomplished by this commission
 is problematical. No record is left of their "labors" and, if a
 report was filed with the governor, it was buried in the admin-
 istrative archives and was never recorded. Doubtless the ques-
 tion of code revision was permitted to lag because of approach-
 ing statehood and the current belief that thereafter a new state
 code would be needed. Certain it is, that one of the first acts of
 the first legislative session, after statehood had been granted,
 was to provide for a complete and thoroughly revised system
 of laws.108
 Arthur S. Beardsley
 University of Washington
 106 H. H. Bancroft, History of The Pacific States of North America: Wash-
 ington, Idaho, and Montana, 1845-1889 (San Francisco, 1890), xxvi, 299.
 107 Ine Statutes at Large and lreaties of lhe United otates of America, Iõ51-
 1855 (Boston, 1866), x, 172.
 ios For certain help in the preparation of this article the author is indebted to
 Mr. Arthur Remington of Tacoma and Mr. Frank Pierce of Seattle.
 Bibliography of Washington Territorial Codes
 (Throughout the preceding article the term "code" has been used in
 its popular rather than its technical sense. The codes do not have individ-
 ual paginations separate from that of the other general acts but usually
 will be found at the front part of the volume.)
 Code of 1854, in Statutes of the Territory of Washington, 1854. (Olym-
 pia, 1855. Lxvii 488 pp.)
 Code of 1859 [1860], in Acts of the Legislative Assembly of the Terri-
 tory of Washington, 1859-60. (Olympia, 1860. in 523 pp.)
 Code of 1863, in Statutes of Washington Territory, 1862-63. (Olympia,
 1863. xc 144 v 572 pp.)
 Code of 1869, in Statutes of the Territory of Washington, 1869. (Olym-
 pia, 1869. 832 pp.)
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 Code of 1871, Amendments, in Statutes of the Territory of Washington,
 1871. (Olympia, 1871. 262 pp.)
 Code of 1873, in Laws of the Territory of Washington, 1873. (Olympia,
 1873. 776 pp.)
 Code of 1881, in Code of Washington. (Olympia, 1881. xlviii 580 pp.)
 Bagley's Supplement to Code of 1881, in Laws of Washington Territory,
 compiled by John P. Judson and Elwood Evans. (Olympia, 1881.
 50 pp.)
 Bagley's Supplement to Code of 1881, compiled by John P. Judson and
 Elwood Evans, [second edition.] (Olympia, 1884. 50 pp.)
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